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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 920114 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO PRESENT ANY BASIS FOR THIS 
COURT TO GRANT REVIEW OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' HOLDINGS THAT INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS 
NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SECURITIES 
FRAUD UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) 
AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE "GOOD FAITH" DEFENSE 
In the court of appeals, petitioner argued that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that "intent to 
defraud" is an element of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. 
S 61-1-1(2) (1989). Br. of Appellant, Case No. 900473-CA, at 60-
69. The court of appeals rejected this argument on the grounds 
that the jury was correctly instructed that "willfully" is the 
culpable mental state for criminal liability under section 61-1-
1(2) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1990, 1991). 
State v. Larsen. No. 900473-CA, slip op. at 13-14 (Utah App. Feb. 
7, 1992) (a copy of the corrected opinion, issued March 24, 1992, 
is contained in the addendum). 
Petitioner argues that this Court should review the 
court of appeals' decision because it "directly collides with the 
interpretation of the related federal provision on which Utah's 
Act was patterned and with which Utah's law was intended to 
harmonize." Petition at 5. While he correctly notes that the 
legislature adopted the Uniform Securities Act and that section 
61-1-1 is a mirror image of section 101 of that act, he 
incorrectly implies that section 101 was patterned solely after 
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-10B-5. Id., 
at 6 (citing Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment). 
The comment to section 101 states in pertinent part: "This 
section is substantially the Security and Exchange Commission's 
Rule X-10B-5, which in turn was modeled upon § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of I5JJ[.]" Comment, Uniform Securities Act, 7B 
U.L.A. 516 (1985) (emphasis added). Without acknowledging the 
comment's additional reference to section 17(a), which is 
significant in light of the case law he cites, petitioner then 
relies on selected portions of three civil cases from the United 
States Supreme Court as support for his claim that "scienter"1 
is an element of the crime of securities fraud, in addition to 
the element of "willfulness" required under section 61-1-21: 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680 (1980); and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
1
 Petitioner uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State 
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud." 
2 
In Hochfelder, the issue was "whether an action for 
civil damages may lie under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 . • . and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 
10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant." 425 U.S. 
at 187-88.2 Based on its review of the plain language of 
section 10(b) and the legislative history, the Court held that a 
private cause of action for damages will not lie under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any allegation of 
'scienter' — intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 
2
 Section 10(b), from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it 
"'unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.'" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195. Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, . . . 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 688. This language is nearly identical to 
that contained in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
section 61-1-1. 
3 
193. 
Relying on this Hochfelder, defendant asserts that 
criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) requires proof of 
intent to defraud, and goes on to imply that Aaron and Dirks were 
decided in the criminal context and thus directly support that 
conclusion.3 However, both those cases were civil appeals, and 
neither provides direct support for defendant's conclusion. The 
issue in Aaron was "[w]hether the Securities and Exchange 
Commission . . . is required to establish scienter as an element 
of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 . . ., § 10(b) of the Securities 
3
 By misquoting and mischaracterizing Hochfelder, Aaron, and 
Dirks, petitioner leaves a false impression as to the scope of 
those decisions. For example, he purports to quote Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. at 193 n.12, and states: "There is 'no indication that 
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach [under § 
10(b)] in the absence of scienter' — the 'intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.'" Petition at 8. Although footnote 12 
contains the following sentence: "In this opinion the term 
'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.", no sentence even resembling the one 
constructed by petitioner appears there, nor does that footnote 
stand for the proposition suggested by petitioner. Indeed, 
petitioner's purported quote of footnote 12 appears to be a 
marriage of the "scienter" language of footnote 12 and an 
entirely unrelated sentence at p. 205 of the Hochfelder opinion, 
where the Court refers to sections 9(a)(6) and (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and states: "[T]here is no indication 
that any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the 
absence of scienter." 425 U.S. at 205. 
Also, in the parenthetical that follows petitioner's 
citation to Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23, he writes: "in criminal 
prosecution, '[s]cienter — 'a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate or defraud,' [citation omitted] — is an 
independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation." Petition at 8-9 
(alteration by petitioner). This parenthetical is followed by a 
citation to Aaron. However, neither of those cases were decided 
in the criminal context, and there is no reference to a "criminal 
prosecution" at the cited page or footnote in Dirks. 
4 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . ., and Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
under that section of the 1934 Act." 446 U.S. at 682. In Dirks, 
the question was whether an officer of a broker-dealer firm 
violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws 
by disclosing material nonpublic information from "insiders" of a 
corporation to investors. 463 U.S. at 648. 
Noticeably absent from petitioner's discussion of Aaron 
is that decision's holding that subsections (2) and (3) of 
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 do not require proof 
of intent to defraud. Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities . . ., 
directly or indirectly — 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon the purchaser. 
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 687. The Court held that the language of 
section 17(a), which is nearly identical to that of section 61-1-
1, "requires scienter4 under § 17(a)(1), but not under 
S 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." Id. at 697. Focusing on the plain 
4
 The Court used "scienter" here in precisely the way it did 
in Hochfelder: intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 446 
U.S. at 696. 
5 
language of subsection (2), the language at issue in the instant 
case (see § 61-1-1(2)), the Court observed that M§ 17(a)(2), 
which prohibits any person from obtaining money or property 'by 
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission 
to state a material fact,' is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever 
of a scienter requirement." J[d. at 696. 
Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, the United 
States Supreme Court case law interpreting federal securities 
laws does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to 
require proof of an intent to defraud; all that is required is 
proof that the defendant acted "willfully," as provided under 
section 61-1-21. Not only does petitioner reach far beyond the 
plain language of the statute in an effort to secure support for 
his position, a violation of the fundamental principle of 
statutory construction that " [unambiguous language in [a] 
statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning," 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), he 
misreads the federal case law. Furthermore, numerous courts have 
held that intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of 
securities fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2). 
See, e.g., Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F. 
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes); 
People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08 
(Mich. App. 1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v. 
Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review 
6 
denied (Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433 
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v. 
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v. 
Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v. 
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v. 
Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983); 
State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (1980) (en 
banc). 
In sum, the court of appeals' rejection of petitioner's 
contention concerning an intent to defraud is consistent with the 
prevailing view in this country. Review is not warranted, and 
the Court should deny certiorari on this issue. See Utah R. App. 
P. 46. For the same reasons, certiorari should be denied on the 
issue of whether "good faith" is a defense. See Petition at 9-
13. As petitioner acknowledges, the good faith defense goes 
"[h]and-in-hand with the scienter element." JId. at 9. Because 
an intent to defraud is not required under section 61-1-1(2), a 
good faith defense is not applicable. See, e.g., Sparrow v. 
United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making 
clear that the good faith defense does not apply to "the 
defendant's good faith as to the existence of any particular fact 
or situation," and cautioning that although a good faith defense 
exists with regard to the plan or scheme as a whole, "no matter 
how firmly the defendant may believe in the plan, his belief will 
not justify baseless, false, or reckless representations or 
promises"). 
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POINT II 
PETITIONER FAILS TO PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL 
BASIS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS TO GIVE 
OPINION TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE 
"MATERIALITY" OF INFORMATION NOT DISCLOSED TO 
INVESTORS 
Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari to 
review the court of appeals' holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the State's expert witness to 
give opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of 
information petitioner failed to disclose to investors• Although 
the State conceded below that this issue was a close one, 
petitioner fails to present a substantial basis under rule 46, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for granting certiorari. 
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of 
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the 
'absence of a clear showing of abuse.'" Larsen, slip op. at 9 
(quoting Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)). See 
also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long as 
the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' Utah R. Evid. 702, its 
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court 
even if such testimony addresses an 'ultimate issue.'"). Cf. 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah Apr. 23, 
1991) ("[w]hether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question 
of law, and we always review questions of law under a correctness 
8 
standard," but when the rule of evidence "vests a measure of 
discretion in the trial court," the appellate court reverses only 
if it concludes that the trial court exercised its discretion 
"unreasonably") Petitioner does not challenge the court's 
application of that standard of review. Furthermore, he does not 
demonstrate that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that 
the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion. In fact, 
where the issue was necessarily a close one, the court of appeals 
correctly deferred to the trial court's decision which was 
reasonably supported by the analysis in United States v. Leuben, 
812 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir.), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 
1987), and the broad construction this Court recently gave to 
rules 702 and 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in Span, 819 P.2d at 
332 n.l ("Case law supports the proposition that an expert may 
render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime. . . . 
As long as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue,' . . . its 
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial 
court[.]"). In short, the court of appeals would have been 
justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no 
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision." Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying 
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's 
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted). Petitioner 
does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to 
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no 
9 
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision; indeed, he 
presents no argument to that effect. In essence, in seeking 
certiorari, petitioner focuses on an alleged error in the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling, rather than any substantial error in 
the court of appeals' review of that ruling. This Court recently 
made clear that such an approach is not appropriate for purposes 
of certiorari: 
We take this opportunity to remind the bar 
that when exercising our certiorari 
jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-2(3)(a), 
we review a decision of the court of appeals, 
not of the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the decision of the 
trial court. To restate the matter: We do 
not grant certiorari to review de novo the 
trial court's decision. See Utah R. App. P. 
46. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, No. 900272, slip op. at 6 n.2 (Utah Apr. 7, 
1992). Although the Court's admonition was made in the context 
of deciding a case in which certiorari had been granted, that 
admonition is equally applicable to petitions for certiorari. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
deny the instant petition for certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of April, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
RE: State of Utah v. C. Dean Larsen 
Case No. 900473-CA 
(filed February 7, 1992) 
The attached copy of the above opinion replaces the original 
copy you recently received. It contains minor additions in the 
factual section which, because of computer problems, were not 
included in the opinion as it was originally issued. 
Please disregard the earlier copy; the attached copy 
reflects the version of the opinion as it will appear in 
published form. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
C. Dean Larsen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FEB 0 | 1992 
$W/ T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeate 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900473-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 7, 1992) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
Attorneys: Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of 
securities fraud and theft on the ground that the Office of the 
Utah Attorney General (the Attorney General) should have been 
disqualified from the case for a conflict of interest. Larsen 
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was 
prompted by disclosure of confidential information from his 
attorney, and constituted an ethical violation. Larsen also 
challenges the admissibility of opinion testimony by the State's 
expert, the court's failure to prohibit certain evidence, and its 
refusal to give certain jury instructions. We affirm. 
I. FACTS 
In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a 
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed 
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate 
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen 
served as president of Granada, a closely held corporation owned 
by him and members of his family. According to Larsen, Granada 
was "inactive" during the first few years after incorporation, 
but in the mid '70s began buying land for real estate 
development. The projects ranged from housing developments and 
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The 
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at 
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in 
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were 
also very successful. 
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was 
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists 
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension 
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in 
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate 
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the 
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a 
different general partner was named. In all, close to one 
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1 
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after 
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More 
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with 
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less 
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a 
recently licensed attorney. 
Larsen claims he hired Farr as his own personal attorney to 
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an 
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorney-
client relationship. Although Larsen disputes that Farr was ever 
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal matters 
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also 
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a 
parking violation by an office vehicle, pro bono litigation, a 
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated family 
partnership as new family members were born. Larsen further 
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions 
and a health plan. 
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working 
"relationship." Farr reported the hours he worked to Larsen, who 
then billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and 
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account in the name 
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr 
relationship lasted approximately four years. 
1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The 
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were 
involved in the forty-two count amended information. 
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Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients. 
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a 
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his 
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that 
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a 
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge 
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients 
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use 
Professional Pension Services (PPS), an entity that Larsen said 
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the 
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid 
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum 
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears 
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to 
Granada-related projects. 
Farr claimed that Larsen failed, in recommending PPS, to 
disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over 
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients' 
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at 
the request of the clients for information about the liquid 
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering 
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid 
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he 
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the loans. 
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional 
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were 
widespread. 
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived 
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be 
resolved. Despite these assurances, nothing was done. Farr 
continued to press Larsen for a resolution and even volunteered 
to handle the matter. Larsen rejected the offer, and hired 
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state 
securities laws. As a result of the growing tension between 
Larsen and Farr, their work relationship was severed in 1982.2 
Following the breakup, Farr continued to be concerned about 
the interests of former "clients," especially their investments 
in Granada. As a result of what he perceived to be ongoing 
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White of the Utah 
Securities Division (Securities Division) in 1983. Farr told 
2. Larsen claims that Farr's failure to make partner was the 
reason for the breakup as well as his motive in reporting Larsen 
to the Utah Securities Division, a rather telling statement in 
view of Larsen's claim that Farr was never even an associate in 
any meaningful sense. 
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White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was 
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the 
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986, 
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division. 
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience 
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen 
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities 
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada. 
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were 
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada 
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for 
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February 
1987. 
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal 
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had 
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the 
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts 
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing. 
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to 
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities 
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to 
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF 
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF). 
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the 
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when 
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division, 
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the 
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing 
in which Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court 
denied the motion. 
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed 
an interlocutory appeal, both of which were denied. Before 
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities 
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also 
moved to prohibit inquiry into the investigation by the 
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF. 
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a 
jury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts. 
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II. DISQUALIFICATION 
A. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been 
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's 
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification 
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that 
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to 
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of 
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The 
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorney-
client relationship existed. Cf. Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 
887, 889 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is 
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial 
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few 
minor transactional matters unrelated to securities or the 
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen7s 
motion to disqualify. 
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports 
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case." Id. at 199. 
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial 
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional 
relationship,3 but admits he "may have fallen somewhat short" in 
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal: 
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law; 
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work for Larsen 
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions 
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution; 
(4) that Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common 
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed 
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor 
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially 
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel 
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a 
(continued...) 
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marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest 
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations 
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the 
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical 
adherence to form over substance. "A reviewing court is entitled 
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Oosahl, 92 111. 
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling 
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to 
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare 
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record 
in search of supporting factual matters). 
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his] 
position," Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991), without presenting any of the evidence supporting the 
trial courts findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to 
meet the marshaling burden [he] must carry." Id. Because Larsen 
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the 
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's 
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters 
unrelated to this prosecution.5 
3. (...continued) 
few minor matters; (8) that the work was unrelated to the matters 
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's 
representation ceased prior to 1983. 
4. Larsen was allowed to file an overlength brief of 81 pages 
after his request to file a 120-page brief was denied. The 81-
page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda 
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and 
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any 
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen 
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous. 
5. Larsen asserts that it was his subjective belief that Farr 
was his personal attorney in all things, but fails to present any 
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client 
relationship. See, e.g., Maraulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (Utah 1985)(an attorney-client relationship was implied 
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which 
the would-be clients had invested); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. 
(continued...) 
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B. Substantial Factual Relationship Test 
Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the 
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr 
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney 
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard 
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows 
(with our emphasis): 
When a lawyer becomes associated with a 
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a 
person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that 
lawyer, or firm with which the lawyer has 
associated, had previously represented a 
client whose interests are materially adverse 
to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
Whether the matters in which Farr represented Larsen were 
"the same or substantially factually related" to the current case 
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial 
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a 
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal 
charges against him. 
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in 
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the 
same or substantially related to the matters for which 
disqualification is now sought. Unless a substantial factual 
relationship is shown between the matters, disqualification is 
not required under the rule because the most basic element is not 
present. Our conclusion that there is no substantial 
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the 
perceived securities problems outside the scope of the legal 
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr 
5. (...continued) 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990)(although an 
attorney-client relationship may be implied by the parties' 
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional 
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the 
attorney's conduct). Cf. Atkinson v. IHC KQSPS.. Inc.. 798 P.2d 
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to 
have represented as shown by the pleadings and other documents; 
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement; 
and the parties' admissions about tl%e relationship). 
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confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's 
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel. 
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former 
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be 
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could 
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent 
employment with the Attorney General. Maraulies v. Unchurch. 696 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, we conclude that, 
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not 
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel. Id. 
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere 
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his 
conviction. In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically 
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an 
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. Id. at 
400. If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy 
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id. 
III. EXPERT OPINION 
Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former 
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now 
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert 
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not 
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was 
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony. Whether or not 
the information was "material" is an element of securities 
fraud.6 
6* It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
(continued...) 
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It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State 
v, Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not 
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear 
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 
1974). Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony 
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical 
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average 
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the 
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart, 
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982). 
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion 
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of 
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended 
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v. 
Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. Kerr-
McGee Corp.. 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal 
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than 
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, f 704[02]. 
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor 
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not 
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate 
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987)(attorney's 
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was 
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether 
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes 
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[t]here is no 
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and 
6. (...continued) 
(3) engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989): 
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an 
ultimate issue as "[t]hat question which must finally be answered 
as, for example, the defendant's negligence is the ultimate issue 
in a personal injury action." 
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those that call for overbroad legal responses," Davidson. 813 
P.2d at 1231.8 
The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of 
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of 
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben. 812 F.2d 
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben, the Fifth Circuit held that 
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being fact-
oriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false 
statements would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan 
officer as a factual element of the governments case was 
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were 
legally "material." Id. at 184. The government was required to 
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of 
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court, 
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert 
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a 
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to 
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185. 
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false 
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns, 
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the 
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to 
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in 
the cases cited by Larsen.9 Accordingly, we are persuaded by 
Lueben that use of the term "material" may be admitted as 
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record, 
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material" 
in a factual sense. 
8. See State v. Span. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah 
1991)(arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally 
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead. 751 P.2d 271, 273 
(Utah App. 1988)(expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate 
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for 
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis 
v. Mason County. 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police 
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in 
failing to adequately train his deputies, and that there was a 
causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs's injuries); 
United States v. Nixon. 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police 
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was 
factual and not a legal conclusion). 
9. See United States v. Scop. 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988); 
Adalman v. Baker. Watts & Co.. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and 
Marx & Co.. Inc. v. Diner's Club. Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir. 
1977). 
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Since the State is required to prove all essential elements 
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged 
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the 
expert testimony. See State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element). 
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the 
casual use of the term "material" and its legal definition could 
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel 
Tech. Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz. 
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989). 
IV. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
A. EFF Fund 
Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from 
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund 
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the 
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial.10 The 
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had 
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told 
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the 
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the 
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their 
structural similarity. 
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the 
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but 
that these documents were only partially completed or non-
existent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it 
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court 
denied Larsen7s motion, stating that the government was entitled 
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his 
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error 
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. 
"Relevant evidence" is defined as that "evidence having a 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable" and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401 
10. In particular, Larsen objected to the State's inquiries into 
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how 
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund, 
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed 
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance 
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which 
properties received monies from EFF. 
and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 
1986)• Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by 
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah 
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded, "[e]vidence that tends to 
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes 
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not 
admissible." State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance 
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of 
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts 
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less 
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal 
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990). 
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons 
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to 
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the 
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate 
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's 
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities. 
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as 
the trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to 
the EFF Fund. 
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other 
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial 
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving 
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent 
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
B. Investigation by the Securities Division 
Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony 
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division, 
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial." 
Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial 
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the 
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later 
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen 
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible 
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
19 
M[I]n order to preserve a contention of 
error in the admission of evidence for 
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely 
objection to the trial court in clear and 
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or 
specific objection on the basis of character 
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific 
ground for objection [is] not clear from the 
context of the question or the testimony, the 
theory cannot be raised on appeal.11 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986) (footnote 
omitted). 
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at 
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made. 
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form, 
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and 
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although 
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403. 
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality, 
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to 
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from 
the context. See State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), 
cert, denied. U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder, 726 
P.2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has 
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the 
issue further. 
V. REMAINING ISSUES 
A. Specific Intent 
Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his 
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible 
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis 
in the evidence to support that theory, jury instructions should 
not incorrectly or misleadingly state the law. State v. Alv, 782 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)). 
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent" 
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive 
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990). 
The Utah Code specifies willfulness as the culpable mental 
state for securities fraud. "Any person who willfully violates 
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any provision of this chapter . . . or willfully violates any 
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three 
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis 
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the jury 
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud 
is "willfulness," rather than specific intent as proposed by 
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows: 
You are instructed that a person engages in 
conduct intentionally or with intent or 
willfully, with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory 
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) 
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed 
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not 
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976) 
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and 
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 61-
1-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud). Inasmuch as willfulness is the culpable 
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was 
unnecessary. 
B. Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions 
We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal 
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not 
address them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 
(Utah 1989). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did 
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client 
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a 
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality 
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element 
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than 
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities 
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence 
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is 
willfulness and the trial court's instruction on the element was 
proper. 
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Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed, ftuatMiiz^ 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
c
—^&J9&*eps^ip£k&d&0^ 
Norman H. Jackson, kludge 
I CONCUR IN PARTS 11(A), IV(B), V(A), AND V(B), AND OTHERWISE 
CONCUR OMLY IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
